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要旨
　1894－95年の日清戦争は、朝鮮をめぐる日清二国間の対立か
ら始まった戦争であり、加えてヨーロッパ列強の利害や思惑も
交錯する多面的な側面を持つ戦争へと発展した。本稿では、こ
のような日清戦争の特徴を踏まえたうえで、イギリスがこの戦
争をいかに考え、日本や他の列強とどのように関わっていたの
かについて、日本へと譲渡されることになった台湾領有問題に
おける外交政策から考察する。日清戦争をきっかけにして、日
本が東アジア国際政治のファクターとして存在感を強めたこと
により、東アジア国際政治は再編を余儀なくされた。これらの
状況を鑑みると、国際政治において圧倒的な影響力を持ってい
たイギリスがこの問題を通して選択した政策を考察すること
は、その後の国際政治を見るうえでも大きな意味があると思わ
れる。
　日清戦争が日本に有利に進展していくなかで、1894年の年末
にはすでに講和交渉にむけた水面下での動きが起こった。イギ
リスは、香港を東アジアの拠点として活動しており、また上海
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での商業権益が急速に拡大していたため、講和条件の一つであ
る日本の台湾領有による中国本土への悪影響を懸念していた。
イギリスにとっての台湾の価値は経済的なものだけでなく、戦
略的にも大きな意味を持っていたのである。そのため、日清戦
争中、イギリスは台湾の多面的な調査を軍部情報機関など各方
面に依頼した。なかでも、海軍省は、台湾を防衛することへの
負担の増大というマイナス面や台湾の港を領有することで戦略
的重要性が増加するプラス面の報告を本国政府に伝えたが、日
本の台湾領有に対してイギリスがとるべき政策を提言すること
ができなかった。外務省も、海軍省と協議をしたが、ぎりぎり
までその判断を先延ばしにした。
　同時期の他の領土問題に関しては、ロシア、フランス、ドイ
ツによる三国干渉があった。ロシアはイギリスにも参加を要請
し、列強間の協調を図ろうとした。これらの状況も踏まえる
と、イギリスが日本の台湾領有に対する政策に迷っていた背景
には、東アジアの現状を維持するためには、中国における権益
への損害の可能性を排除するために日本に抵抗することが重要
なのか、日本の領土要求に賛同して、その関係を重視すること
が将来的な東アジア国際関係を見据えたうえで得策なのか、と
いうその後の東アジア国際政治を左右するような選択になりう
ると認識していたことが考えられる。
　最終的に、海軍省からの報告をもとに、本国政府が決定した
ことは、日本の台湾領有を含めた領土割譲に異議を唱えないと
いうことであった。すなわち、東アジアにおけるロシアなどの
列強間との協調政策よりも、日本との良好な関係を維持するこ
とが東アジアの権益維持には重要であるとの判断を下したので
あった。これは、イギリスが将来的な東アジア国際政治の再編
を考えながら行動した結果であると言える。このような日清戦
争期の日本の台湾領有をめぐるイギリスの政策は、東アジア国
際政治の本質を探るうえで大きな示唆を与えてくれるものだと
考える。
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1 . Introduction
The 1890s marked a watershed in international politics not only in Europe 
but also worldwide.  Britain had exerted enormous inﬂuence in all parts of the 
world and was pressured to reconsider its imperial defense policy of the 
period.  Two reasons for this existed.  First, after Bismarck’s resignation from 
ofﬁce, Russia and France concluded the Franco-Russian Alliance in 
1892.  C. J. Bartlett, in quoting P. M. Kennedy’s position, suggested that in 
many ways the race with both Russia and France that began in 1889 was “a 
more serious matter’’ for British naval mastery than that of Germany before 
1914.  There was a threatened danger that these two rivals might initiate 
action, especially in the waters of the Mediterranean or East Asia.  The 
geographical inﬂuence of France and Russia made it impossible for the British 
to contain their battleships as easily as those belonging to Germany positioned 
in the North Sea1）.
Although the alliance between Russia and France was primarily for the 
purpose of competing with Germany, it was expected that Russia would gain a 
foothold in the Mediterranean, establishing a Mediterranean ﬂeet with France, 
and causing Britain to do extensive damage to its own interests in 
Mediterranean.  In addition, Russia had obtained a loan from France and had 
begun construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway in an attempt to promote its 
interests in East Asia, even though Russia had already competed with Britain 
over Port Hamilton in northern East Asia between 1885 and 1887.  Between 
1884 and 1885, France had engaged in ﬁghting with China in the south and 
had waited for an opportunity to become involved in China.  Great Britain 
was concerned about Russian and French advances because Britain controlled 
over 80% of China’s foreign trade2） and had established a strategic base in 
Hong Kong as a result of its victory in the Opium War.  Hong Kong had 
developed into a bridge between South China and the Indo-Malayan world, 
and Great Britain wanted to protect its interests in East Asia.  Although East 
Asia was the farthest area from Europe, China had become an integral part of 
1 ） C. J. Bartlett, Defence and diplomacy, Britain and the great powers, 1815-1914 
（Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993）, p.87.  P. M. 
Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1914 （London: Fontana Press, 1984）, pp.167-
8.
2 ） L. K. Young, British policy in China, 1895-1902 （Oxford, 1970）, p.5.
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the military and economic history of Europe, and in particular, of British 
imperialism dating from the mid-19th century3）.
The second reason the British wanted to reconsider its imperial defense 
policy was that new rising powers, such as Germany, the United States, and 
Japan, were ascending into the world of international politics after 
1890.  After its victory in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1, Prussia was 
integrated into the German empire.  Germany had reinforced its military 
power and industrial might and moved forward with Weltpolitik under 
Friedrich Wilhelm II.  The United States had concluded the Civil War and 
was making advancements in the Paciﬁc and East Asia.  The Japanese had 
experienced the Meiji Restoration, succeeded in rapid economic growth, and 
increased its military power4）.  Because these three powers had turned their 
interests to East Asia, the international situation was thrown into increasing 
confusion by the participation of new actors, and it was assumed that British 
policy toward East Asia would have an effect not only on British imperial 
policy but also on international politics. 
Because of the interest of several countries in East Asia, the area was 
undoubtedly becoming an important factor in the transformation of 
international politics after the 1890s, and it was the Sino-Japanese War of 
1894-5 that was one of the triggers.  Britain was forced to consider the 
changes within international relationships to protect its interests in the East 
Asia.  For that reason, the British searched for a new strategic location in East 
Asia, speciﬁcally north of Hong Kong.  One of candidate sites for a new 
foothold was Formosa, an area France had tried to occupy between 1884 and 
1885.
In this thesis, I examine the importance of Formosa in British policy in 
East Asia and the inﬂuence Japan had on British policy when it possessed 
Formosa during Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5.  These considerations will 
serve as an aid to clarify the process of transformation from the old system 
referred to as the “Concert of Europe” after establishment of “Vienna System” 
to the new one of 20th century.
3 ） Jurgen Osterhammel, ‘Britain and China, 1842-1914’, Andrew Porter （ed.）, The Oxford 
History of the British Empire, Volume3, The Nineteenth Century （New York, Oxford 
University Press Inc., 1999）, p.146.
4 ） Hosoya Yuichi, Kokusai chitsujo, 18 seiki Europe kara 20 seiki Asia （Chuko Shinsho, 
2012）, pp.168-170.
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2 . Strategic Importance of Formosa to Britain 
The only strategic foothold that Britain attached great importance to in 
East Asia during the mid-19th century was Hong Kong, where the China 
Squadron had been dispatched by the British government to maintain peace in 
waters surrounding Hong Kong and to pay attention to the activities of other 
nations, especially Russia.  However, as Shanghai developed as a center of 
commerce, the British government realized it was essential that the China 
Squadron protect British economic interests in Shanghai because of the 
growing interests of the French, Germans, and the United States.  In addition, 
the Russian naval assets on the Chinese coast during the 1890s threatened to 
deprive the China squadron of local superiority and hamper Britain’s ability to 
protect its imperial and commercial interests on the Yangtze and in North 
China5）. 
To accomplish these goals, the British government thoroughly examined 
possible suitable location for a new strategic foothold north of Hong 
Kong6）.  One possibility was Port Hamilton, a point of strategic importance 
that was considered “the key to the Korean Strait, and an advanced post of 
great value in connection with the Sea of Japan” because it could provide a 
coaling station and a harbor north of Shanghai if a war were to break out in 
East Asia.  Vice-Admiral Alfred Phillips Ryder, Commander-in-Chief of the 
China Squadron in 1875, was interested in occupying Port Hamilton to protect 
against Russia’s possible expansion south from eastern Siberia, but the British 
government dismissed his idea7）.  Between 1885 and 1887, the China 
Squadron, under the order of the British government, temporarily occupied 
Port Hamilton, assuming a war would be forthcoming against 
Russia.  However, the China Squadron eventually withdrew from Port 
Hamilton for sake of improving Anglo-Russian relationships.
The second possible suitable location was Formosa, a transportation 
5 ） Hamish Ion, ‘Towards a naval alliance: some naval antecedents to the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance’, Philips Payson O’brien （ed.）, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-22 
（London: Routledge, 2004）, pp.26-7.
6 ） H. D’Arch Breton, ‘Thoughts on Imperial Defence’, Blackwood ’s Edinburgh Magazine, 
Vol.157, 1895, p.679.
7 ） Ion, ‘Towards a naval alliance: some naval antecedents to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’, 
p.32.
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crossroads and a place of strategic importance where ships could control the 
Formosa Strait and the Bashi Channel.  Britain has been interested in Formosa 
since the mid-19th century and had reconnoitered off the coast of Formosa 
twice in September 18418）.  In October, Britain bombarded the port of Kelung, 
which was north of Formosa, and showed more interest in Formosa than 
before.  France and Germany made plans to occupy these islands in East Asia 
to secure a strategic foothold after the 1880s9） and Britain was aware of the 
possibility that the occupation would greatly affect British interests in Hong 
Kong. 
When the Sino-Japanese War broke out in August 1894, Britain studied 
the importance of Formosa and the Pescadores Islands and considered to 
possessing them to forestall France and Germany’s interests.  On December 
19, 1894, Joseph H. Longford, Vice-Consul in Tokyo and later Consul in 
Formosa, submitted a “Memorandum Respecting the Island of Formosa” to the 
Earl of Kimberley, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which he 
analyzed the island’s economic and strategic value.  He referred to economical 
inﬂuence on Britain in case of Japan’s possession of Formosa as follows:
［ Japanese］ consider that the island, when properly developed, will 
capable of supporting a population of nearly 7,000,000 people.  It will thus 
afford an outlet for the surplus of the steadily increasing population of Japan 
for several years to come, and its advance in trade will be encouraged by 
making all its port free.
The extended cultivation of the two staples, sugar and raw cotton, in 
Japanese soil would undoubtedly very speedily seriously affect British trade 
in the East.  The value of the import of raw cotton from British India has 
during the last two years （1892-3） averaged 4,000,000 dollars, and this trade 
in addition furnished lucrative employment for diminish, but it would be 
wholly lost did it ever became possible for the Japanese to obtain an 
adequate supply, which would be transported exclusively in their own 
subsidized steamers, from within their own dominion.  An immense 
impetus would also then be given to the already ﬂourishing and extensive 
8 ） Tianzhao Dai, Taiwan Kokusai Seijishi Kenkyu （Hosei University Press, 1971）, pp.273-
4.
9 ） F. Q. Quo, ‘British Diplomacy and the Cession of Formosa, 1894-5’, Modern Asian 
Studies, 11-2, 1968, pp.142-3.
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cotton-spinning industry in Japan, and the Japanese spinners would advance 
one step further towards the realization of their ambition to oust English and 
Bombay yarns and to gain complete control of the whole yarn market 
throughout the East, a market that is at present supplied entirely by Great 
Britain and India...It is conﬁdently expected that Japanese reﬁneries will be 
able to undersell the products of those of Hong Kong, which now practically 
possess a monopoly of the supply of reﬁned sugar both in China and Japan, 
the result being the loss of the whole of the valuable trade of Hong Kong in 
this staple.
Longford was also concerned about adverse effects the construction of a 
Japanese naval base would have upon Britain.  His strategic analysis was that 
“it will enable Japan, before many years are over, to establish a secure base 
from which, not only the whole southern coast of China, with the important 
and wealthy cities of Swatow, Amoy, and Foochow, might be safely 
threatened, in the event of China ever in the future sufﬁciently recovering her 
strength to tempt her to seek revenge on Japan fore her present humiliations, 
but also the entire coasting trade between the northern and southern ports of 
China, all of which passes through the Formosa Channel, might at any time be 
stopped” and that “a Japanese arsenal on the west coast, or even on the north 
in the neighbourhood of the already existing productive coal mines, would be 
little less threatening to Hong Kong or to British shipping passing to the north 
of China, than it would to the ports on the Chinese coast or to Chinese 
shipping.” 
Moreover, Longford pointed out that the only harbor available for a ﬂeet 
was that of Kelung in the north because the island of Formosa was deﬁcient in 
harbors, and the Pescadores Islands could supply the needed harbors and that 
“Japanese would ﬁnd all they require for the construction of a strong naval 
arsenal.”　Longford warned the Foreign Ofﬁce that the British government 
needed to recognize the importance of having an immediate, large, and 
permanent increase in both the garrisons and defenses of Hong Kong, as well 
as possibly those of Singapore and of the China Squadron10）.  Early in 
10） FO 46/438, Mr. Trench to the Earl of Kimberley, December 20, 1894, No.199. FO 
46/438, Inclose in No.199.  Sir Edward Hertlet （ed.）, The Foreign Ofﬁce List, 1895, 
British Diplomatic and Consular Handbook, London.
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October, 1894, the Admiralty told Edmund Fremantle, commander-in-chief of 
China Squadron from 1892 to 1895, to dispatch additional warships to East 
Asia to strengthen the China squadron.  The Crescent, which served as the 
ﬂagship of Australian Squadron and the Edgar, Aeolus and Spartan, serving in 
the Mediterranean Fleet, were dispatched after Japanese victories over China 
and the arrivals of Russian naval reinforcements11）.  According to Longford’s 
report, the British government was forced to provide further economic and 
military assistance.
To supplement of Mr. Longford’s report, the Director of Military 
Intelligence offered an evaluation of the Formosa situation on January 25, 
1895.  He reporteded that “not only the cotton trade but also the rice, sugar, 
indigo, and tea products would all affect the markets either of India or Hong 
Kong if opened up by the Japanese” and that “the mineral wealth of island is 
reported to comprise coal, sulphur, petroleum, and a considerable quantity of 
gold.”　He stated that “a remarkable feature of the island is the absence on its 
coasts of sheltered ports”, and that “the harbour of Kelung, which is spacious 
and independent of tide, and an expensive and excellent harbour between 
Ponghou and Fisher, the two largest island of the Pescadores, there are only 
the two treaty ports of Tamsui and Taiwan, neither of which are of great 
value.” The Director of Military Intelligence concluded that it was premature 
to offer an opinion as to how the occupation of Formosa by Japan would affect 
Britain strategically12）.
The Earl of Kimberley received information from the Church Missionary 
Society that “in the event of Formosa being taken possession of by Japan, ...the 
Hunan soldiers who occupy Formosa would land at Amoy, and would 
assuredly devastate the country right up to Foochow”13）.  It was presumed that 
11） Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power, A History of British Naval Policy 
in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905 （New York: Alﬂed A. Knopf, 1940）, pp.231-2. 
Edmund Fremantle, The navy as I have known it, 1849-99 （London: Cassel 1904）, 
p.439.
12） Ian Nish（ed.）, British Document on Foreign Affairs, Part.1, Series E, Asia, 1860-
1914, Volume 5, Sino-Japanese War and Triple Intervention, 1894-1895 （University 
Publication of America, 1989）, War Ofﬁce Intelligence to Foreign Ofﬁce, January 25, 
1895, Doc.49. ［Hereafter referred to as ‘BDOFA’］
13） BDOFA, vol.5, Rev. B. Baring-Gould to Church Missionary Society, December 11, 
1894, Doc.16. 
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the devastation could spread to Hong Kong.
Thus, the local reports expressed to the Foreign Ofﬁce their anxiety about 
the harmful inﬂuence upon Britain and presented a negative conclusion as to 
the effects of Japan’s possession of Formosa.
3 . British Policy Regarding the Possession of Formosa 
by Japan
In February 1895, European powers decided on position they would take 
if Japan seized territories.  On February 21, Sir Frank Lascelles, the British 
ambassador to Russia, sent a telegram to the Foreign Ofﬁce that the Russian 
government would not raise an objection to the Japanese taking Formosa but 
that they would have serious objections to the Japanese’s possession of 
territory in northern China because it would bring the Japanese into closer 
proximity to the Russian frontier14）.
France also regarded as unfavorable the cession of territories to Japan, 
particularly Formosa and the Pescadores Islands.  The French ﬂeet had 
occupied the Pescadores Islands and blocked the Taiwan Strait temporarily 
during the Sino-French War15） and had patrolled the islands and conducted 
coastal and harbor surveys around Hainan island during the Sino-Japanese 
war16）.  As a result, France has strongly recognized the geopolitical and 
strategic importance of the islands.  On February 22, Marquis of Dufferin, the 
British ambassador to France, reported to the Earl of Kimberley that “French 
opinion would be very adverse to the cession of the Pescadores Islands, 
though it was more perhaps a matter of sentiment than policy.”　However, he 
stated that he ﬁrmly believed France had changed its opinion about Japan’s 
possession of Formosa and it approved the possession because Russia, an ally, 
had not protested the possession17）. 
Although Russia and France acted pursuant to the term of the Franco-
Russian Alliance and did not object to the possession of Formosa by Japan, 
they did object to Japan’s obtaining the Liaotung Peninsula in northeast 
14） FO 405/62, Sir F. Lascelles to the Earl of Kimberley, February 21, 1895, No.122.
15） Ito Kiyoshi, Taiwan （Chuko Shinsho, 1993）, p.60.
16） Quo, “British Diplomacy and the Cession of Formosa, pp.143-4.
17） BDOFA, vol.5, The Earl of Kimberley to Marquis of Dufferin, March 20, 1895, Doc.216.
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China18）.  Russia emphasized the importance of its cooperation with Britain 
on this question and wanted Britain to require Japan moderate the peace terms 
for the three countries.
The Earl of Kimberley faced the dilemma of deciding whether to accept 
the demands of Japan relating to the territories.  He agreed that international 
politics in East Asia had reached a turning point19）.  On the one hand, it was 
of great signiﬁcance for Britain to maintain good relationships with other 
powers, especially Russia, and to act in concert with them because the Russian 
naval squadron in the Paciﬁc had been strengthened; if the envisioned 
concerted action failed, Russia would have the option of pursuing a different 
course20）.  On the other hand, Britain feared that if Russia took the initiative 
in international politics in East Asia, it would replace Britain. 
Thus, the Earl of Kimberley was pressed to make a ﬁnal decision whether 
to object the conﬁrming actions of both Russia and France21）.  The rational 
reasons why Britain was troubled with making a decision was that it could not 
decide how to treat Japan or know what kind of relationship it should build 
with Japan in the future.  After serious consideration, the Earl of Kimberley 
perceived that it was more important for Britain to preserve its present 
interests rather than to take into account uncertain situations in the future.  He 
decided to follow Britain’s original policy, searching for cooperation with 
Japan rather than with Russia and France.  He requested information from 
Admiralty before making his ﬁnal decision. 
Thereupon, the Admiralty immediately asked Fremantle for his views on 
the situation relating to Formosa and the Pescadores Islands.  Fremantle 
strongly urged Britain to purchase, or otherwise obtain, the Pescadores Islands 
to assure that British products would securely continue to pass through the 
Taiwan Straits.  Fremantle believed that Makung in the Pescadores, being 
only 300 miles from Hong Kong, was a good harbor to control the Straits so 
long as it remained a strong naval power22）.  However, his idea did not ﬁnd 
18） FO 405/62, Sir F. Lascelles to the Earl of Kimberley, March 25, 1895, No.218
19） T. G. Otte, The China Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894-1905 
（New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2007）, p.63.
20） Ibid., p.49.
21） BDOFA, vol.5, The Earl of Kimberley to Marquis of Dufferin, February 22, 1895, Doc. 
126.
22） ADM 1/7248 S32, Conﬁdential, Sir Edmund Fremantle to Admiralty, March 7, 1895.
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approval from the Admiralty.  On March 23, 1895, in response to the Foreign 
Ofﬁce, Evan MacGregor, the Permanent Secretary to the Admiralty during the 
Sino-Japanese war, forwarded a letter “as to the naval value of Pescadores” 
stating the opinion of the Admiralty.  The substance of letter provided:
 
...these islands ［Pescadores Islands］ contain excellent anchorages and a 
good harbour at Makung, whose value is considerably enhanced on account 
of those in the neighbouring Island of Formosa being very poor.  Moreover, 
the position of the islands would give that harbour great weight in the eyes 
of a naval Power which had either aggressive designs on China or Formosa.
It appears certain that the Pescadores group would be occupied or used 
by the Power having undisputed command of the sea, but it is doubtful, in 
their Lordships’ opinion, whether Makung Harbour would be worth turning 
into a permanent naval base, as, from the land being comparatively low and 
accessible to naval attack from many points, the difﬁculty and cost of 
efﬁciently defending it would be great23）.
MacGregor also provided information about the island of Formosa to the 
Foreign Ofﬁce.  The Admiralty considered that the island possessed no really 
good harbor and that the only good harbor, Kelung, was exposed to strong 
northeasterly winds and to the sea but that the island would have considerable 
value because Kelung could be improved by artiﬁcial means and easily made 
defensible in the hands of an energetic sea power24）.  After duly considering 
these reports, the Admiralty concluded that Britain would have no choice but 
to approve Japan’s possession of the islands.  However, it may be gathered 
from the Admiralty’s remark that it wavered in its judgment as to whether the 
objection against the possession of those islands by Japan would serve the best 
interests of Britain. 
Much to the credit of the Earl of Kimberley and Earl of Rosebery, the 
prime minister, realized the necessity of continued cooperation with Russia 
and decided not to purchase it and risk confrontation with Japan.  This 
decision was the result of a rationalization of the refocusing of British policy 
in favor of Japan25）.  On April 18, 1895, with the approval of the British 
23） FO 405/62, Admiralty to Foreign Ofﬁce, March 23, 1895, No.216.
24） FO 405/63, Admiralty to Foreign Ofﬁce, April 6, 1895, No.12.
25） Otte, The China Question, p.63.
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government, the Earl of Kimberley stated to Kato Takaaki, the new Japanese 
minister to Britain, that Britain concluded it was logical for Japan to demand 
the cession of the territories of Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and Liaotung 
Peninsula as a result of its victory over China, even though it was not 
appropriate for Britain to agree to the cession of those territories to Japan or to 
state that it indicated approval of the possession of those territories by Japan26）.
Russia requested that Britain participate in the Triple Intervention, in 
which Russia, France, and Germany forced Japan to give up the possession of 
the Liaotung Peninsula.  However, the British attitude regarding the cession 
of territory to Japan did not change.
4 . Cession of Formosa to Japan and British Policy 
toward China
In March 1895, in the midst of pressuring Britain for an answer about 
Japan’s possession of Formosa and the Pescadores Islands, China tried to 
maintain close relationships with Britain to prevent Japan from possessing the 
islands and proposed two plans to Britain.  One plan proposed that “Formosa 
might be hypothecated to a syndicate of British bankers as a security for a 
loan.”　The other plan proposed that “it might be made over to a British 
Company”27）. 
In February 1895, Li Hung Chang, the Viceroy of Chihli and Minister of 
Pei-yang Commerce, had already applied to Nicholas Roderick O’Conor, the 
British minister to China, to obtain British support to oppose the possession of 
Formosa by Japan because the Chinese believed it would be harmful to 
Britain’s interests and that Russia would be adversely affected by the cession 
of Liaotung Peninsula to Japan.  O’Conor received instructions from the Earl 
of Kimberley and urged Li to accept peace terms to rapidly regain peace in 
China, rejecting the Chinese proposition28）.  Chinese authorities believed 
Britain might accept its demands and had the intention of raising the issue of 
the possession of the islands as a diplomatic problem because it was convinced 
that Russia would raise an objection to the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula 
26） Nihon gaiko bunsho, Meiji 28 vol.2, no.721.
27） BDOFA, vol.5, The Earl of Kimberley to Mr. O’Conor, March 15, 1895, Doc.189. 
BDOFA, vol.5, The Earl of Kimberley to Mr. O’Conor, April 1, 1895, Doc.253.
28） FO 405/62, Mr. O’Conor to the Earl of Kimberley, February 24, 1895, No.137.
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to Japan.
The Earl of Kimberley responded to the Chinese Minister, indicating that 
“it would be impossible for Her Majesty’s Government to support either of 
these arrangements” because he believed it would not be advantageous to the 
Chinese Government at that time29）.  There were several reasons why the 
suggestions were not rejected.  First, the Chinese proposal for raising money 
was very vague, and the Chinese appeared to be under the impression that the 
British government might be willing to advance a large sum of money as 
security for Formosa30）.
Second, the British were worried that the Japanese troops would advance 
to the area south of Shanghai and obstruct the British trade on the Yangtze 
River if Britain decided to accept the Chinese proposals31） because Japan had 
unconditionally accepted a British demand for the neutrality of Shanghai early 
in Sino-Japanese War32）.
 The Earl of Kimberley thought that it would be advisable for Britain to 
agree to the cession of Formosa and the Pescadores Islands to Japan to prevent 
Japan from conducting reprisals against it.  Thereupon, he urged the Chinese 
minister to consider that “the Chinese, looking to the present state of affairs in 
China, should make every effort to conclude peace without delay”33）.
Public opinion in Britain kept in step with its government’s view; and 
public was strongly pro-Japanese34）.  For example, on April 8 1895, The Times 
carried an article indicating that Britain should not interfere with the cession 
issue because China might not honor its obligation to develop resources in 
Formosa and because, from a geographic standpoint, it was beneﬁcial for 
Britain that Japan possessed Formosa as a trading port35）.
China, failing to win Britain’s approval, approached Russia to obtain the 
protection it needed to gain possession of Formosa and the Pescadores 
29） Ibid., Doc.253.
30） BDOFA, vol.5, The Earl of Kimberley to Mr. O’Conor, March 15, 1895, Doc.190.
31） BDOFA, vol.5, The Earl of Kimberley to Mr. O’Conor, April 1, 1895, Doc.253.
32） Cf. Ozaki Yosuke, British diplomatic strategy toward East Asia in the end of the19th 
century: the Anglo-Japanese relations over the Shanghai neutrality problem during the 
Sino-Japanese War, Seiji Keizai Shigaku, no.525, 2010. 
33） BDOFA, vol.5, The Earl of Kimberley to Mr. O’Conor, April 1, 1895, Doc.253.
34） Otte, The China Question, p.67.
35） The Times, April 8, 1895.
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Islands.  But China did not obtain Russia’s approval because Russia was not 
interested in the islands.  After Britain and Russia rejected China’s request, 
China approached France for help.  Because France had become interested in 
the islands after the Sino-French War, it decided to dispatch troops to the 
area.  However, because a revolt occurred on the Island of Madagascar, a 
French protectorate, France canceled the troop dispatch36）.
Although European powers such as Britain, Russia, and France decided 
not to accept the Chinese proposal for preventing Japan from getting 
possession of Formosa, China did not give up its requests during or after the 
Triple Intervention.  China offered to transfer the island to Britain again, 
paying the expenses of defending it.  On April 18, a conﬁdential agent of the 
Viceroy of Nanking secretly communicated to Mr. Hopkins, British consul in 
Tamsui （Formosa）, a message on behalf of the governor of Formosa, stating 
that rather than relinquishing the island to Japan, China would enter into a 
treaty with Britain, giving Britain immediate protection37）.  On April 20, the 
governor of Formosa told Mr. Hopkins that his control had been weakened by 
the cession of island to Japan and that he had no power to protect the lives or 
property of foreigners.  Additionally, Mr. Hopkins was informed that a 
consensus of people on Formosa “prayed that the island might be placed under 
British and Germany protection, proposing that these Powers should receive 
the duties from coal, camphor, tea, gold, sulphur, while China should retain 
territory and administration, and continue to receive land-tax”38）.  The 
information failed to cause Britain to change its mind, and it consistently 
rejected China’s proposal, because Britain had decided to convert Japan, not 
China, over to the British side.
In May, shortly after the Triple Intervention, 36 men from Her Majesty’s 
ship Leander landed at Anping, in southern Formosa, and 30 marines from 
Her Majesty’s ship Centurion landed at Twa-tu-tia, in the north.  A rumor 
spread quickly that Britain might occupy the island, and government ofﬁcials 
quickly took advantage of the rumor.  Hayashi Tadasu, Vice-Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, asked G. Lowther, Charge d’Affairs in Japan, to explain the 
true meaning of the rumor.  At the behest of the Earl of Kimberley, Lowther 
36） FO 46/451, Mr. Trench to The Earl of Kimberley, March 22, 1895, No.95. Dai, Taiwan 
Kokusai Seijishi Kenkyu, pp.240-242.
37） FO 405/63, Consul Hopkins to Mr. O’Conor, April 20, 1895, Inclosure 1 in No.373 A.
38） FO 405/63, Consul Hopkins to Mr. O’Conor, April 20, 1895, Inclosure 2 in No.373 A.
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replied that British government did not have any intention of occupying 
Formosa, and denied the rumor immediately39）.
5 . Conclusion
British diplomacy relating to the problem of Japan’s possession of 
Formosa exposed the limitations of the British imperial defense policy under 
“Splendid Isolation.”　The British government decided to reinforce the China 
Squadron to protect against a case of unforeseen emergency in the expansion 
of the war in October, 1894; however, its efforts were insufﬁcient.  Although 
further reinforcement of the China Squadron was necessary, its efforts were 
limited because a reinforcement of the China Squadron weakened the 
effectiveness of the British ﬂeets at home and in the Mediterranean40）.
Britain had analyzed and compared the military power of both Japan and 
China and had rated Japanese military power as modern and potential during 
the Sino-Japanese War41）.  Britain began to recognize that it was important 
and necessary to cooperate with Japan to maintain its interests in East Asia 
without further burdens and, as a result, decided to adopt its own policies such 
as nonparticipation in the Triple Intervention and agreeing to peace terms, 
including the cession of the territory.  In this way, Britain intended to take 
advantage of Japan’s being the bulwark against Russia and establishing good 
39） FO405/63, Mr. Lowther to Mr. Earl of Kimberley, May 11, 1895, No.419.
40） Ion, ‘Towards a naval alliance: some naval antecedents to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’, 
p.35.
41） FO 405/60, Comparative Statement of the Chinese and Japanese Navies, July 16, 1894, 
No.90. FO 405/60, Memorandum on the relative Values of the Armies of China and 
Japan, July 16, 1894, No.92. On July 16, 1894, Admiralty submitted a report titled 
“Comparative Statement of the Chinese and Japanese Navies” to Foreign 
Ofﬁce.  Admiralty estimated that “the organization of Chinese ﬂeets is still to a large 
extent provincial; on the other hand, the Japanese navy is a purely Imperial force, and 
its organization has been copied with considerable ﬁdelity from that Western navies.”
　　　　Intelligence Division also submitted a report to Foreign Ofﬁce, to the effect that 
the Japanese Army “is well equipped and organized, and ready for work.  They are very 
rapid marchers, willing, obedient, and nationally enthusiastic.  Their transport and 
medical services are well organized and in efﬁcient condition, their arms are good and 
bears comparison with Chinese much in the same way as the forces of nineteenth 
century civilization compare with those of mediaeval times.”
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relationships with Japan42）.
In this way, Britain attempted to apply the system of “balance of power” 
to international politics in East Asia and play a role as a balancer.  The 
strongpoint of British diplomacy during 19th century was to play a key role as 
a balancer in traditional European international politics for the geopolitical 
reason that Britain was away from European continent and had been more 
interested in overseas expansion than in European problems.  In doing so, 
Britain had maintained the system of “balance of power” in Europe and had 
contributed to the stabilization of the European international order.  It seems 
fair to say that it was the result of the system of “balance of power” and 
Britain’s role as a balancer that prevented a great war from the time after the 
conclusion of the Napoleonic wars to the beginning of World War I in Europe. 
In East Asia, Britain feared that Russia’s plan had been made clear in the 
Triple Intervention, and that the plan would deprive Britain of a position of 
leadership as a result of Russia’s expanding interests and aggressive 
intervention in affairs of this area.  Therefore, Britain was under pressure to 
take measures to meet the situation, to maintain the status quo, and to restrain 
Russia’s rapid expansion of the inﬂuence.  One such measure was to approve 
the cession of the territories to Japan and convince Japan to its way of 
thinking.  Britain tried to revise international order based on the system of 
“balance of power” by recognizing Japan as one of the main actors in 
international politics of East Asia and use its strength to inﬂuence and 
maintain the 19th century system of international politics.
Britain clearly recognized the strategic importance of Formosa in terms 
of the necessity of protection for its interests in East Asia.  Nevertheless, 
when Britain unconditionally consented to the cession of Formosa to Japan, it 
quickly realized that the international politics in East Asia would have an 
inﬂuence on Europe and that the countries would be linked.  It may be said 
that the beginning of the transformation of the international order before 
World War I was established during the Sino-Japanese War, particularly in 
British diplomacy toward the cession of Formosa to Japan.
42） Sasaki Yoh, ‘Igirisu kyokuto seisaku to nisshin kaisen’, Saga daigaku kyoikugakubu 
ronsyu, 29-1, 1981. Sasaki insists that Britain had already regarded Japan as the bulwark 
against Russian southward advance at the time of the start of War.
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